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A CRIMINAL trial is a substitute for private war and, on occasions, must be fought with swords and not with foils. Unless this is clearly understood, the expert witness may allow calm scientific judgment to be ousted by emotion, and his evidence will lose some of its effectiveness.
Medical men do not usually censure the criteria required to establish a verdict that the accused is insane on arraignment. Their criticism, more often destructive than constructive, is reserved for the criteria of irresponsibility according to the McNaghten Rules. The McNaghten case never came before the House of Lords in its judicial capacity, and the well-known Questions of the Judges and the Answers of the Lords only referred to the effect of insane ignorance and insane delusions. But insanity affects the emotions and wills of men as well as their beliefs, and discussions concerning disorders in which emotional and volitional abnormalities predominate have brought about a wider immunity for insane persons than is sometimes supposed. In a recent trial for murder (R. v. Buckfield) the defence of an alibi failed, but the Judge when passing sentence of death informed the prisoner that "investigation would be made by the proper authorities as to whether there was any medical explanation of his act". And the Court of Criminal Appeal, when refusing to accept a plea of insanity which the jury has disregarded at the trial, frequently calls attention to the fact that the Secretary of State has special powers to enable him to order a medical enquiry concerning the mental condition of appellants convicted of murder.
Mercier, as the result of thirty years' close study, was unable to recall any case in which a prisoner was convicted on evidence that appeared to him to justify acquittal of the accused on the ground of insanity. For forty years I have been closely concerned with the subject, and have no doubt that the present procedure and practice result in justice being done to the public as well as to offenders. Zilboorg believes that the law relating to responsibility is unlikely to alter in the near future. Kinberg observes that, even if a serviceable definition of imputability could be made, it would be of no use, and would before long be a hindrance in the rational solution of problems connected with responsibility. I believe that if a medical formula of criminal responsibility was introduced we might be called upon to adhere rigidly to its specifications, with resulting hardship to offenders and embarrassment to psychiatrists. The urgent need of to-day is not a reform in the law regarding criminal responsibility, but an improvement in our evidence as forensic psychiatrists.
It seems that the principle of modified responsibility is accepted in cases of mental defectiveness, some cases of drunkenness and infanticide. The Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, provided alternatives to imprisonment. In D.P.P. v. Beard, the House of Lords established the principle that drunkenness not involving insanity might be a valid excuse in certain circumstances in negativing the fact that the accused had, at the time he did the act, the accompanying intent necessary to constitute the particular crime with which he is charged. The Infanticide Act, 1938, accepted the principle of a disturbed balance of mind, which in certain circumstances might justify a verdict of infanticide, and enable the defendant to be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of manslaughter and not murder. The term "criminal responsibility" is concerned with acquittal on the ground of insanity, and alternatively with conviction and punishment. I believe that psychiatry has advanced sufficiently to justify the acceptance of the principle of modified culpability in convicted offenders suffering from a recognized form of minor mental abnormality, if the degree of blameworthiness lies somewhere between that attached to the unlawful act of a normal person and one who is insane according to law. For this purpose a clear mental classification of offenders is necessary, separating the normal, subnormal, mentally defective, psychopathic personality, psychoneurotic and psychotic groups from one another. The mentally normal group of offenders is probably at least 80% of the receptions. Statistics show that the proportion of mentally defective is about 0*5% and of the insane 1%. Research is necessary before estimates can be made regarding the proportion of offenders who are subnormal, psychopathic personalities and psychoneurotics.
The normal group deserves close study as the term implies a hypothetical standard. It is misleading, and sometimes incorrect, to assess mental normality by normal conduct and successful social adaptation. If the view that normality is indefinable is accepted, diagnostic limitations and the necessity to estimate behaviour by the standards of others as well as one's own becomes apparent, and offenders in this group are seen to be responsible and culpable. There is no reason to consider that persons in the subnormal group are irresponsible, but there may be reason to believe, and occasionally to affirm, that their culpability from the medical point of view is lessened, particularly if they are known to be persistent offenders and their behaviour is unaffected by repeated sentences of imprisonment. Low-grade mentally defective persons if unfit to plead are declared insane on arraignment. Apart from the modified sentence passed upon others under the Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, medical opinion will usually agree that culpability may be lessened in some cases of high-grade defectiveness. The criminal psychopathic personalities include psychic inferiors, temperamentally unstable persons, alcoholists, drug addicts, true sexual perverts and non-progressive cycloid, schizoid and paranoid psychopathic personalities. In this group of non-insane non-sane deviates, the dividing line between abnormalities due to disease and anomalies of character is sometimes obscure. There is much to be said for the legal view that these offenders are responsible, but the nearer the condition is to mental disease and the further from an anomaly of character, the more inclined will be the observer to consider whether culpability should be modified. In the psychoneurotic and psychotic offenders responsibility according to law, modified degrees of culpability and of irresponsibility may be evaluated.
In cultured society the law must have the last word. But intensive study of the inherent mental constitution of offenders and the impacts of disease may enable medical evidence to assist a court to modify the award in a manner which will encourage social rehabilitation. Culpability, as I see it, is the more certain the more symptoms of recognized mental abnormality are lacking, the more insight the offender has into his condition, the more his emotional threshold is unaffected, and the more deliberately and frequentlv his will is concerned in the commission of the offence. The more satisfied we are that a crime is due to faults of character and not to the effects of disease, the more reason shall we have to consider that the law-breaker is responsible.
Mr. Roland Burrows (President of the Medico-Legal Society) said that the Society were very much indebted to Dr. Norwood East for his paper. It was always a good thing from time to time to examine general concepts to see whether they were really of as much value as they were habitually and unconsciously assumed to be. When a man of Dr. Norwood East's acknowledged pre-eminence discussed a topic of such importance as this they could not but be grateful toi him for the light thrown not only on the conception but on the progress of information which enabled his hearers to determine whether their own concepts should be modified or not in the light of progress of knowledge.
With regard to criminal responsibility he spoke as a lawyer. The underlying conception was that human beings must live in society. Society was only possible if its members lived accordin'g to rule, the rule constituted, in the ultimate analysis, something which would be enforced upon everybody by the whole of the individuals included in society. He meant "by the whole" substantially the whole. Of these rules some were what was known as the criminal law and as he understood them, crimes were supposed to be such acts so inconsistent with the life of society that their commission or omission would be punished-in other words, they must not happen.
One tended to forget in dealing with the individual that the criminal law was established for the protection of the whole of society and when it came to a question of enforcing it one was up against certain facts which could not be ignored and which it was impossible to do without.
The rules of criminal law were difficult to establish and hard to alter and they tended therefore to lag behind contemporarv opinion. That was why the offender sometimes received a great deal of sympathv from people who were not minded to break the law. The administration of criminal justice was put into the hands of people who were getting older and whose concepts were based upon their past experience of twenty or thirty vears ago and who tended, on the seat of justice, to be a little impervious to the views, ideas and experience of people who had come into existence at a later date. The topic was one which was simple in earlier times because if a person committed an offence of the kind known as a felonv he was simply eliminated, but as the members forming society had increased so the importance of the ordinarv individual wvho offended against the criminal law had become of more importance or seemed to have done.
One had to remember when dealing with an individual who had offended against the law that he was a person who had shown by his actions that he had at least a tendency to be anti-social which, if it was allowed to grow, would tend to disrupt society altogether. Furthermore, on the conception of the criminal law that it resulted in punishment a circumstance which is dominant although it is being modified very rapidly-a person who offended against the criminal law would, if simply punished, in the ideas of most people be unfairly treated and there had been evolved gradually a set of ideas which constituted the law relating to irresponsible persons, and assuming that that class of individual existed, and must exist, the conception of punishment in regard to sLuch individuals became extremely difficult. If the simple idea of punishment was adhered to then it was unfair to punish. If the simple logic of the old common law was adopted, irresponsible people would go free and one would create a class of individuLals like the Herrenvolk who were exempt from the law. It appeared to the speaker that if a person was to be treated as irresponsible on the ground of some peculiaritv to use a neutral term then the corollary was that he should not be left free but should be put under some form of restraint.
Restraint was punishment however much one might object to it.
What sort of restraint? This was where the medical profession came in. The lawyers could deal adequately with the bad man, but they were almost incapable of dealing with the mad man and thev were certainly not capable of dealing with the treatment of the indiv idual wvho was hovering betveen mad and bad. These were the individuals about whom Dr. Norwood East had been talking. It had been suggested, and it was a matter wvhich required considerable thouLght, that the function of the criminial courts shouild be modified to a certain extent and he was not sure (although his mind was quite open on the subject) that there wvas not something to be said for it, that the function; of the courts should be limited to saying whether the accused was guilty or not guilty of the offence charged. What happened to the defendant afterwards shouldl be decided by some authority after proper considleration, and treatment, imprisonlment or punishment imposed upon that individual so that he should if possible be tuLrned into an ordinary law-abiding member of societv or else excluded from societv. That might or might not be combined with the discretion of the judge to determine whether it was a case where combined punishment or some form of precaution, such as probation, shouild be imposed, and limited only to those cases where, in the view of the court, a man should receive that kind of treatment.
Anybody like himself who was entrusted with the dutv of sentencing people wvho had committed offences knew that the determination of the penalty wvas the most difficult and anxious part of the task of a criminal judge.
Dr. H. Crichton-Miller felt that Dr. Norwood East had left the impression that the present svstem could be adapted to the needs of real justice. He wondered if that was possible. The whole question of motivation had undergone a transformation in the last thirty or forty years and they were now faced with dealing withi problems of culpability with unconscious motivation, perfectly clear to the psychiatrist but absoluLtely hidden from the public and the judiciary.
He would give an example; a woman was repeatedly arrested for shop-lifting, she was married to a town clerk and had two daughters. There was no cause for her shoplifting, it was just absurd and on one occasion the magistrate said: "I must give this woman a lesson, she has been repeatedly convicted and a person of her social standing should know better", and he gave her a fairly round sentence. What were the facts known to the psychiatrist? She was very deaf and her deafness was incurable, and she was developing the paranoid system which so often accompanied progressive deafness. She had, however, another grievance even more biologically founded. She had always longed for a son but had been disappointed twice; she hoped for a son again but her husband said that there were to be no more children. Not only did he deny her maternal aspirations but he also refrained from satisfying her sexual desires. One saw perfectly well that that woman could have been helped; one saw at the same time that she was not going to be helped by any lesson which the magistrate gave her. This was why the speaker felt that they must go deeper than the question of public justice which left out, necessarily, considerations of that description.
Another example was that of a woman in her final year of medicine at a provincial University who had epileptic fits. One day in his waiting room she had the bad taste to undress and there was a minor domestic crisis in consequence. There was nothing to take her into the hands of the law but if she had come into the hands of the law, the question would have arisen as to whether she was responsible or not, and whether she was sane or insane. He would not like to think that a fifth year medical student was insane, some of the lawyers might have thought it was a possibility but he would assure them that it was not. The woman was wholly irresponsible and in the sense of the modern phrase this occurred while "the balance of her mind was disturbed". This was a good phrase and covered a good deal of suicides nowadays. But he moved from that case to one who, more sane than the fifth year medical student, was a successful professional man and had many friends. He was popular and successful and had a 4-year-old son to whom he was devoted. He had a difference of opinion with his wife andi she; left him saying she was never coming back and that she was going to take his son with her. The man murdered the son and attempted suicide. That man was sane, that is, Broadmoor refused to describe him as insane, but for the purpose of the judiciary because he committed this act, he was a murderer and the verdict was "guilty but insane", therefore he was insane from the point of view of committing this act. He continued to spend his life in Broadmoor but he was not insane, that is to say, Broadmoor refused to give him any certificate of insanity which might allow of his estate being dealt with by others.
Could a clean cut be made on sanity or insanity? Surely the question of temperamentally irresponsible people must mean that there was a possibility of things happening which were not to be treated in the ordinary way.
Both psychiatrists and lawyers should make more clear the difference between the deterrent element in a sentence and the retributive, educational or rehabilitational aspects.
In such cases as shop-lifting he would have thought that a magistrate could differentiate in his sentence between so many days imprisonment as the minimal deterrent sentence for the act in question on the one hand, and, on the other, so many extra days as retributive or re-educative penalty for deliberate intention, or again no extra at all when unconscious motivation (and therefore irresponsibility) could be demonstrated. In other words, the deterrent factor in punishment must be maintained in the interests of society; the retributive must be adjusted to, the degree of responsibility and attributed by the magistrate to the delinquent.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. W. Pearce, R.A.M.C.: As recently as 1937 Mr. Page said that a great majority of the general public, and indeed many judicial authorities, still regard wvith grave suspicion all medical evidence as to the mental abnormalities or psycholgical difficulties of a person charged with a criminal offence.
Criminal Courts are courts of law, not of morals, and the psychiatrist may well leave the problem of criminal responsibility to the lawyers and concentrate his attention on the concept of medical culpability. In this, however, he cannot exclude a consideration of moral law, nor can he fail to study the whole field of penology. Any major changes in law or judicial procedure should be based on really systematic psychiatric studies of antisocial conduct and antisocial persons. The aim of law and the aim of punishment are the protection of society. The reformation of the offender is an essential aim only in so far as it does not imperil societv. For example, sexual offenders are by no means all amenable to treatment and on the question of culpability medical opinion is often at variance. It may be contrary to the welfare of society for a persistent sexual offender to be at liberty during the early stages of treatment. The need for society to be protected is exemplified in a case where the mother of a little girl 8 years old, having taken money from a middle-aged man, kept a lookout while he took the child into a wood and used her sexually. The unfortunate little girl subsequently became profoundly depressed. The analysis and explanation of such conduct surely make an urgent challenge to psychiatry. I sometimes wonder how many doctors realize the immense toll of harm inflicted on society by the hard core of professional criminals. For a certain proportion of offenders the practical measure is permanent segregation, but society still baulks at this.
The real province for the psychiatrist is after the finding of guilt. It is then that psychiatric examination can best be carried out, and expert information submitted to the court to assist the court in reaching a wise decision in passing sentence. Only suitably trained and experienced doctors should be authorized to work in such an expert advisory capacity; otherwise a great deal of nonsense will be talked and published. Firmness and cruelty are no more synonymous than are mercy and weakness. Psychiatrists know that a really sharp punishment at the very outset of a delinquent career is frequently most efficacious. It is the psychiatrist who is best equipped to assess the degree of real moral guilt in an offender.. The study of medical culpability will establish finally that punishment based on expiation and retribution as well as rarely being effective is often frankly ill-advised; and that if it is to succeed in protecting society punishment must both be deterrent and reformative. I think, too, that in many indictable offences the prnciple of restitution is a wise one to apply. That very enlightened measure, the Criminal Justice Bill, provides opportunities Zor working out these problems of culpability. I think we have enough knowledge now to warrant active advocacy of a lowering or abolishing of the age-limit below which the principle of doli incapax applies. And such a law is surely mischievous which so ignores medical knowledge that it stipulates that a boy just short of his fourteenth birthday cannot have carnal knowledge; and which so disregards psychiatric knowledge as to say that he cannot have mens rea. We shall have much to say on this, a matter which might well be selected as one of the first problems demanding solution.
Dr. Norwood East, in reply, said that the time had not yet arrived to go deeply into medico-psychological explanations of crime because they had not only to retain as doctors the confidence of the lawyers and of the executive authorities but-a fact which nobody had mentioned-must remember that highly technical explanations of crime might antagonize the public. Unless the public were gradually educated into medical views a great deal more harm would be done to their cause than they might imagine. The lawyers and the executive authorities always gave doctors, wherever they could, their fullest confidence. Speaking from forty years' experience, he had no complaint to make either with regard to the lawyers or the executive authorities and he felt most strongly that doctors, by further close study of minor mental abnormalities, would better understand their cases and thus help the law. If the Criminal Justice Bill became law after the war a great deal of influence would be given to the medical profession to assist in the treatment and the deterrence of crime.
